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INTRODUCTION
Where a certified class of plaintiffs seeks systemwide, prospective relief to protect the
right to counsel, it must show that the public defense system creates a substantial risk of harm
that their Sixth Amendment rights will be violated. This test applies no matter the size of the
system challenged, and no matter the number or nature of any subdivisions contained within it.
Like all class actions seeking injunctive relief, a systemic challenge to a public defense system
does not require individualized inquiries into whether all class members have already suffered
harm. Instead, it examines the public defense system’s structural underpinnings to determine
whether its policies and procedures create a significant and unacceptable risk of constitutional
harm to indigent defendants.
Though the State rightly concedes that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
does not govern this case, and rightly acknowledges that Strickland assesses whether the
“outcome” of a final criminal proceeding was prejudiced, Respondents’ Br. at 16, the State never
explains why it makes sense to set aside Strickland’s case-by-case, retrospective inquiry, only to
replace it with the case-by-case, retrospective inquiry prescribed in Strickland’s companion case:
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Both are post-conviction cases that measure
whether a specific defendant’s already-concluded criminal proceeding was already so prejudiced
that setting aside a conviction and remanding for renewed proceedings or another trial is
warranted. Though both Strickland and Cronic identify national standards and other factors
useful for evaluating right-to-counsel violations, Plaintiffs are aware of no case law—and the
State offers none—requiring Plaintiffs to show that every class member across the entire state
has suffered Cronic prejudice in their individual cases in order for the class to be entitled to
prospective relief to protect Sixth Amendment rights in the future.
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Plaintiffs therefore urge this Court to join the chorus of courts across the country and
adopt the substantial risk of harm test for deciding Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective relief.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Standard of Proof for Retrospective, Post-Conviction Relief Does Not Apply to
Systemic Claims Seeking Prospective Relief.
Strickland offers guidance for courts judging the constitutionality of criminal defense. In

particular, Strickland identified national standards, especially American Bar Association
standards, as guides for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. But
the State acknowledges that the retrospective, post-conviction standard of proof prescribed in
Strickland is irrelevant here. Strickland sets forth a standard for undoing a particular conviction
in an individual case. Id. at 687, 690 (articulating the issue as whether “counsel’s assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction,” based on retrospective analysis of “the facts
of the particular case”). As all parties recognize, that is not the nature of this action.
Like Strickland, Cronic also provides guidance for courts as they consider impacts on an
individual defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 652, 658–660,
663 (identifying factors and circumstances relevant in deciding whether to reverse or undo a
conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel). But Cronic, just like Strickland, addressed
the standard for undoing convictions on a case-by-case basis, not the standard for determining
whether an entire system suffers from constitutional deficiencies. Id. at 658 (deciding whether to
reverse a conviction without a showing of actual prejudice “in a particular case”).1 Whether to

1

Although the United States Supreme Court declined to affirm the reversal of Harrison Cronic’s
conviction on circumstantial ineffective assistance grounds, after remand the Tenth Circuit
reversed it on actual prejudice grounds under Strickland. United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d
1401, 1404 (10th Cir. 1988). Cronic was convicted again following his second trial, but the
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bring prospective, equitable relief to bear on systemic constitutional violations does not call for a
retrospective, case-by-case standard of proof that cautions against upsetting final convictions.
The standards adopted in both Cronic and Strickland are grounded in concerns about
judicial economy, the costs of retrospective relief, and the need for finality in criminal
proceedings. In Strickland, the Court expressed reservations about “intrusive post-trial inquiry”
generating “second trial[s]” over counsel’s performance, which could “become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.” 466 U.S. at 690, 697.
The prejudice standard the Court adopted was, accordingly, rooted in the “strong presumption of
reliability” for the results of trial court proceedings that have already concluded. Id. at 696.
Cronic stressed that reliability presumption as well, retrospectively reviewing the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence in that defendant’s particular case. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 664. The
Court made it clear that post-conviction analysis is focused entirely on counsel and any errors
that counsel made: “external constraints” on counsel’s performance, such as a limited time to
prepare for trial, do not justify reversing an existing conviction “absent an actual effect on the
trial process or the likelihood of such an effect.” Id. at 662 n.31.
This Court has already held that such case-by-case inquiries are inappropriate in this case,
a systemic challenge. Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 19, 394 P.3d 54, 62 (2017) (“Tucker I”).
After all, none of the considerations underpinning Cronic or Strickland—for finality, judicial
economy, and the presumption of the reliability of trial court proceedings—present themselves in
civil cases, such as this one, seeking prospective relief. Rather, the entire purpose of prospective,

Tenth Circuit reversed that conviction as well—permanently—this time for lack of evidentiary
support. United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990).
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systemic challenges is to prevent harm in the future. See Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252,
132 Idaho 385, 388, 973 P.2d 156, 159 (1999).
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized in Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 637 Pa. 33, 70,
146 A.3d 715, 737 (2016), the circumstances in Cronic “were markedly different” than those in a
prospective relief case. “Cronic addressed a post-conviction claim, and focused upon whether a
post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate prejudice after being constructively denied counsel.”
Id. Unlike petitions seeking to undo individual convictions, prospective systemic civil
challenges promote rather than frustrate judicial economy by reducing the number of postconviction ineffective assistance cases, ensuring future convictions are not undone on those
grounds, and preventing remands and retrials. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 787 (La.
1993). To prevail on prospective claims, therefore, neither actual nor presumed prejudice needs
to be proven. Id. (“[T]reating ineffective assistance claims before trial where possible will
further the interests of judicial economy…It matters not that the ineffective assistance rendered
may or may not affect the outcome of the trial to the defendant's detriment.” (citation omitted)).
Transported from its retrospective, post-conviction roots into the jurisprudence governing
prospective, systemic relief, Cronic does provide guidance on the types of structural features that
pose systemic risks of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 But its individualized, retrospective

2

Reoriented into a prospective posture, Plaintiffs have already easily met Cronic’s criteria. They
meet the actual denial at a critical stage test because the State continues to fail to guarantee
system-wide representation at initial appearances. Plaintiffs meet the failure of adversarial
testing standard because of Idaho’s outrageous workloads, which the State’s expert and the
PDC’s own workload standard commentary effectively acknowledged. R., p. 10886:24–
10888:24 (“You get to the point [with excessive caseloads] where the lawyer is no longer sort of
able to provide that adversarial testing in every case.”); R., p. 13127–28 (“[E]xcessive workloads
dissolve the right to competent and effective counsel by prohibiting a public defender’s ability to
devote the time and attention required for a meaningful and adversarial testing of the charges
against her clients” (citing Cronic)). And Plaintiffs meet Cronic’s “circumstances” test because
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approach offers little value in probing whether a public defense system is prospectively
unconstitutional. See Kuren, 637 Pa. at 70, 146 A.3d at 737; see also State ex rel. Missouri Pub.
Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Mo. 2012) (“No case suggests that a court
analyze whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been preserved at all critical stages
only by retrospectively determining that the lack of such counsel deprived a defendant of a fair
trial.”); Lavallee v. Justices In Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 238, 812 N.E.2d 895,
905 (2004) (recognizing that no specific showing of harm is necessary for relief on prospective,
pretrial right-to-counsel challenges, where “it is enough that [plaintiffs] have shown a violation
of that right that may likely result in irremediable harm if not corrected”). That the interests
undergirding Cronic and Strickland, which tilt against undoing convictions, do not set the
standard for prospective, systemic challenges is nothing new to the law, to this case, or to the
State. This Court has already recognized that Plaintiffs do not seek relief in their individual
cases. Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d at 62. The prospective, systemic reform they seek is
guided by cases like Kuren, Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), and HurrellHarring v. New York, 119 A.D.3d 1052 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), discussed again in more detail
later in this brief.
The State has been well aware of this body of law for years. Not only did this Court
acknowledge these cases in its first opinion in this case, Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19–20, 394 P.3d
at 62–63 (citing Kuren, Luckey, and Hurrell-Harring), it became a focal point of the class
Idaho’s system calls on counsel to provide assistance under circumstances where “the likelihood
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance” is small, for all
of the reasons detailed in Plaintiffs’ opening brief. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–660; see also
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A system for appointed
counsel may be challenged successfully if the evidence demonstrates that the system itself so
greatly hinders the effectiveness of the counsel it appoints that a presumption of effectiveness is
based on an unbelievable hypothesis of competence.”).
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certification litigation below and has been repeatedly revisited since. Conducting a “preliminary
exploration of the merits,” the district court rejected the State’s insistence that this case be
resolved by examining diverse and dissimilar experiences among many different public
defenders across counties with various public defense arrangements. R., p. 908; R., p. 913.
Instead, the district court, consistent with this Court’s direction, made plain that this case is about
the constitutional effectiveness and adequacy of “the State and the PDC’s policies and practices,”
not whether the assistance counsel provided in any particular county, on any particular occasion,
or to any particular defendant was insufficient. R., p. 914–915.
The district court recognized that it does not matter that Plaintiffs have suffered different
injuries in the past and may currently have different needs. R., p. 920 (quoting Parsons v. Ryan,
754 F.3d 657, 685–86 (9th Cir. 2014)). The State itself acknowledged that Plaintiffs expressly
pleaded the substantial risk standard that the State now protests Plaintiffs recently invented. See
R., p. 201–204, paras. 183, 186, 190, 193. And the district court confirmed it, certifying a class
focused on common questions about Idaho’s statewide system and policies, including whether
the State has “fail[ed] to implement, administer, and oversee” that system or failed to ensure
effective legal representation by inadequately funding or supervising it. R., p. 918. Both the
State—referencing the statewide legislation, rulemaking, enforcement, and funding this litigation
has begat—and the Ada County Public Defender as amicus curiae—citing that same statewide
funding as the reason it has been able to add attorneys, staff, and training—confirm that
statewide policies, administration, funding, and supervision control the capacity and quality of
public defense across Idaho, down to the county and attorney level. Respondents’ Br. at 1; Ada
County Public Defender’s Office (“Ada County”) Amicus Br. at 1.
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Rather than confront whether the State’s policies, administration, funding, and
supervision are structurally adequate under the United States and Idaho Constitutions’ right to
counsel provisions, the State instead seeks to turn this class action into a massive joinder of
retrospective Cronic claims. Prospective claims do not rise or fall on proof of prejudice—either
actual or presumed—that must be weighty enough to overturn a conviction or rebut the presumed
reliability of concluded trial court proceedings. This case, instead, simply calls for the Court to
determine the system’s constitutionality by examining the system’s architecture. If that
architecture is truly sound, then certain county-level challenges plus the usual, retrospective
case-by-case ineffective assistance claims must provide remedies instead. But if the statewide
architecture is so flawed that the architecture itself poses substantial risks, as has been true in
Idaho for years, then the system as a whole is unconstitutional. Leaving it entirely to individual
indigent defendants to discover and seek redress for prejudicial impacts that a defective system
had on them after the fact is not the law.
II.

Courts Across the Country Have Adopted the Substantial Risk of Harm Standard
of Proof for Systemic Claims Seeking Prospective Relief.
A.

The Substantial Risk of Harm Standard Is the Established One for Equitable
Relief, and Is Entirely Consistent with the Preventative Aim of Injunctive
Relief.

It is undisputed that the injunctive relief that Plaintiffs seek here is designed “to prevent
injury, threatened and probable to result, unless interrupted.” Miller, 132 Idaho at 388, 973 P.2d
at 159 (quoting Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores, Inc., 71 Idaho 178, 187, 228 P.2d 436, 441
(1951)); cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (Plaintiffs need not “await
the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.”). The substantial risk of
harm test is rooted in this well-established equitable principle. Specifically, this standard
provides a remedy only where it is shown that systemic issues in a public defense system would
APPELLANTS’ REPLY – Docket No. 46882-2019
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otherwise create a substantial risk that indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights will be
violated. It is axiomatic that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent the future violation of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Miller, 132 Idaho at 388–89, 973 P.2d at 159–60 (injunction
preventing violation of due process rights); New York Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d
376, 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2002) (“Granting prospective relief to secure constitutional
standards in state proceedings based on evidence of the likelihood of depriving fundamental and
statutory rights has long been within the province of the courts.”).
The State suggests that the Court ignore this time-honored equity analysis just for this
case. See, e.g., Respondents’ Br. at 24 (attempting to distinguish Luckey v. Harris on the basis
that it “quote[d] a general standard for prospective injunctive relief”). The Ada County Public
Defender’s Office, on the other hand, attempts to distinguish between a likelihood of future
harm, which would merit relief, and a substantial risk of future harm, which it argues should not.
Ada County Amicus Br. at 12–13. Plaintiffs agree with the Ada County Public Defender that
Idaho law requires a showing of a “likelihood of repeated injury or future harm…in the absence
of the injunction.” Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d at 62. But this standard is entirely
consistent with a showing of a substantial risk of harm, which far exceeds a mere “possibility of
harm,” which has been found insufficient to support injunctive relief. See Larsen v. Vill. of Lava
Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64, 73, 396 P.2d 417, 476 (1964) (involving a public nuisance action);
Ada County Amicus Br. at 12.
There is simply no meaningful difference between a showing that future harm to
members of a class is likely and a showing that a risk of future harm to members of a class is
substantial. Indeed, a substantial risk standard might actually be more stringent—not less.
Because the degree of the likelihood of future harm (i.e., “how likely?”) is not specified, a
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requirement to show a substantial risk of such harm may demand a showing of the greater odds
of future harm. In short, the normal principles of equity support injunctive relief to prevent
future harm to class members, whether that harm is characterized as likely to occur, or at
substantial risk of occurring.
B.

Courts Have Applied the Substantial Risk of Harm Standard in Cases
Raising Structural Sixth Amendment Claims.

Rather than refute the substantial risk of harm test’s long-standing foundation, the State
mischaracterizes the relevant Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in order to set up and then attack a
series of strawmen. Nowhere is this more apparent than with respect to the State’s discussion of
Luckey, 860 F.2d 1012. The plaintiffs in Luckey alleged a series of “systemic” flaws that
threatened to violate their Sixth Amendment rights, including the denial of “investigative and
expert resources necessary to defend them effectively.” Id. at 1018. Because “[p]rospective
relief is designed to avoid future harm,” the court there recognized that such a remedy “can
protect constitutional rights,” including the Sixth Amendment rights Plaintiffs seek to secure
here. Id. at 1017. It was in the context of this analysis—and after expressly repudiating the
applicability of the retrospective, case-by-case Strickland standard to the plaintiffs’ structural
claims—that the court held that “the standard to which appellants, as a class, should have been
held” was a showing of “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” Id. at
1017–18.3 The Eleventh Circuit further held that plaintiffs bringing class-wide claims
3

The State’s and its supporting amici’s remaining criticisms of Luckey are inapposite. That the
decision “never made it to the merits stage,” Respondents’ Br. at 25, or trial, Idaho Association
of Counties (“IAC”) Amicus Br. at 5, is irrelevant to the applicable legal standard it set out.
Moreover, the State is drawing a distinction that does not exist in claiming that the Luckey
plaintiffs alleged “current harms.” Respondents’ Br. at 25. The harms alleged by the Luckey
plaintiffs were still “systemic delays,” Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1018 (emphasis added), and mirror
much of what Plaintiffs have actually shown in this action.
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challenging indigent defense systems are not required to show that Sixth Amendment violations
under Strickland or Cronic are “inevitable for each of the class members,” id. at 1017, much less
prove actual harm among every member of the class.
The case law also does not require a showing of widespread “actual harm,” as the State
seems to suggest. “Actual harm” amounts to the actual or presumed prejudice required for
undoing a conviction. Each of the cases Plaintiffs rely on focuses on systemic issues, which by
their nature will continue to cause harm on an ongoing basis until they are remedied. And for
that reason, these cases do not require a showing of prejudice with respect to each and every
class member, or each and every type of Sixth Amendment violation. In Duncan v. State, for
example, the court did not require a showing of prejudice across the entire system; it required
proof of “widespread and systemic constitutional violations that are actual or imminent.” 774
N.W.2d 89, 121 (Mich. App. 2009) (emphasis added). By referencing the prospect of preventing
“imminent” constitutional violations, Duncan necessarily contemplates preventing harms that
have not yet occurred, but where there is a substantial risk they will occur.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kuren similarly and squarely adopted the substantial
risk of harm test, explaining that “plaintiffs [must] demonstrate the likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury” when bringing structural Sixth Amendment claims. 637 Pa. at 84–
88, 146 A.3d at 746–48. The decision approvingly cited the Luckey substantial risk of harm
standard recognizing “that there is a cognizable cause of action whereby a class of indigent
defendants may seek relief for a widespread, systematic and constructive denial of counsel.” Id.
at 79–80, 146 A.3d at 743.
The court in Hurrell-Harring v. State likewise found that such claims are about “systemwide conditions relating to and affecting the delivery of public defense…and whether these
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conditions…are such that the basic constitutional mandate for the provision of counsel to
indigent defendants at all critical stages is at risk of being unmet.” 119 A.D.3d at 1053
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Contrary to the State’s claim,
an earlier decision in that case does not require a showing of Strickland or Cronic prejudice. See
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367, 372 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).
In Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, a Washington federal court, like all of the other courts
dealing with similar structural Sixth Amendment claims, confirmed that evidence of systemic
flaws that create a risk of harm is what matters:
[T]he issue for this Court is whether the system of public defense provided by the
defendant municipalities allows appointed counsel to give each case the time and
effort necessary to ensure constitutionally adequate representation for the client
and to retain the integrity of our adversarial criminal justice system.
989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126–27 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (looking at number of cases by public
defender as “a sign of a deeper systemic problem”).
All of this Sixth Amendment case law4—and the substantial risk of harm test that it
supports—is applicable here. The legal standard does not change because the plaintiffs in those
cases challenged public defense policies covering less expansive and more homogenous areas
than do Idaho’s statewide policies. Nor does the fact that the indigent defendants in those
systems were served by fewer attorneys than Idaho has, or that other cases were brought by
defense attorneys instead of indigent defendants directly, alter the legal standard to be applied. 5

4

Including State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789, 791 (La. 1993), and Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005), which the State does not address.
Compare Appellants’ Br. at 20–21 with Respondents’ Br. at 21–27.

5

The Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which submitted an amicus brief in
support of Plaintiffs, has a roster of public defense lawyers that far exceeds the twenty-some
individuals who submitted declarations in support of the State in proceedings below. See Idaho
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And it does not matter that this case is the first to challenge the sufficiency of Idaho’s public
defense system. The Sixth Amendment inquiry is the same, regardless of the type of state system
challenged; the number of counties within that system; or the size, resources, and population of
those counties. Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights—and the standards applicable to them—endure,
no matter where they live or where the State chooses to prosecute them.
C.

This Court’s Jurisprudence Supports the Substantial Risk of Harm
Standard.

The substantial risk of harm test is also consistent with this Court’s own jurisprudence
when assessing systemic challenges like Plaintiffs bring here. As Plaintiffs noted in their
opening brief, Appellants’ Br. at 25, 33–34, this Court rejected the State’s nearly identical
attempt to shift the analysis to “small, district-by-district battles” and away from the State of
Idaho’s “constitutional duty” in Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State
(“ISEEO V”), 142 Idaho 450, 455, 129 P.3d 1199, 1204 (2005). The Court instead focused on
whether the State’s funding efforts provided “a safe environment” that would be “conducive to
learning” in the future. Id. Just as it was the State’s obligation under the Idaho constitution to
ensure a “system of public, free common schools,” Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added);
Respondents’ Br. at 28, it is the State’s “ultimate responsibility to ensure the public defense
system passes constitutional muster.” Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 21, 394 P.3d at 64. ISEEO V’s
analysis of the structural evidence needed to demonstrate that “the State has failed in its
constitutional duty” to provide an adequate system of public service is therefore equally
applicable here. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 453, 129 P.3d at 1202.

Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers,
http://www.idacdl.org/DrawMembers.aspx.
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Respondents’ and their supporting amici’s call for county-by-county evidence and
tailoring injunctive relief to specific counties is misplaced for similar reasons. This case, like
ISEEO V, is about whether statewide policies are adequate to meet the State’s obligation to
ensure constitutional public defense statewide. If Plaintiffs were arguing that the policies and
resources were adequate, but the implementation of those policies and use of the resources in
certain counties was not, the Respondents and their amici might be right that county-by-county
implementation evidence is necessary. But Plaintiffs’ argument is that the policies and resources
themselves are inadequate.6 The district court therefore must analyze closely these statewide
structures and policies to assess whether they eliminate the substantial risk of harm that has
existed in Idaho for years.7
D.

The State Misrepresents or Ignores Abundant Precedent Finding Granular
Proof Unnecessary in Cases Seeking Prospective Relief.

Plaintiffs’ opening brief cites a litany of cases in which, as in ISEEO V, plaintiffs alleged
statutory or constitutional violations stemming from government policies or procedures
applicable across challenged systems. Appellants’ Br. at 25–27. In each of these cases, courts
noted that a risk of harm analysis is the appropriate standard for considering claims seeking

6

As the Ada County Public Defender’s Office recognizes, those statewide policies and resources
are the key drivers of the State’s public defense system. See Ada County Amicus Br. at 1
(attributing improvements in that office to indigent defense grants from the PDC—grants which
were unavailable before this litigation).
7

Although not the focus of this appeal, these statewide policies and procedures—and the funding
mechanisms that enable them—would be the focus of any future effort by the State to argue this
case is moot because there is “no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.” See
Ada County Amicus Br. at 20 n.16 (quoting O’Boskey v. First Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass’n of
Boise, 112 Idaho 1002, 1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (1987)).
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prospective and/or declaratory relief for alleged systemic violations. The State’s attempts to
diminish a select few of these cases miss the mark, and they ignore others altogether.8
The State asserts, for example, that the substantial risk test from Eighth Amendment
cases such as Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), and its Ninth Circuit progeny Parsons v.
Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014), has never been extended beyond the Eighth Amendment.
Respondents’ Br. at 28–29. That is not true. In the landmark case of Gerstein v. Pugh, the
Supreme Court afforded classwide relief on Fourth Amendment claims based on a risk of harm
to unspecified class members in the future. 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). The Court, indeed,
granted relief despite the fact that the named plaintiffs were no longer in pretrial detention and
therefore no longer exposed to the risk at issue in the case. Id. at 110–11 n.11.
In B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit invoked
Parsons in finding that a class of minors in foster care could be certified based on allegations
that the state’s foster care system exhibited certain policies and procedures that placed foster
children at a substantial risk of harm under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It makes no difference that Snyder was decided at the class certification stage; the
court plainly identified the injury that plaintiffs would need to prove at trial. Id. at 970.9 See
Brown, 563 U.S. at 505 n.3 (“Plaintiffs rely on systemwide deficiencies in the provision of

8

See Appellants’ Br. at 26–27 (citing M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 271 (5th
Cir. 2018) (foster care); M.B. by Eggemeyer v. Corsi, 327 F.R.D. 271, 280 (W.D. Mo. 2018)
(foster care); Curling v. Raffensperger, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1403 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (voting
rights); J.S.X. ex rel. v. Foxhoven, No. 4:17-CV-00417-SMR-HCA, 2019 WL 1147144, at *8
(S.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2019) (Americans with Disabilities Act)).

9

The State cites a California federal district court case that pre-dated Snyder for the proposition
that Parsons’ and Brown’s risk of harm standard do not apply to non-Eighth Amendment claims.
See Respondents’ Br. at 29 (citing Amador v. Baca, No. CV-10-1649 SVW, 2014 WL 10044904
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014)). Any such holding in Amador has been superseded by Snyder.
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medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in
California to ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’”); Snyder, 922 F.3d at 970 (Plaintiff “define[s]
her claim based on the risk of harm caused by these policies—a cognizable constitutional injury
under our precedent[.]”). Notably, the Snyder court also recognized the applicability of a
substantial risk analysis for systemic statutory claims. While the appellate court vacated class
certification based on a significant risk that the State’s foster care practices and policies violated
the Medicaid Act because the district court did not make sufficient findings to support the class,
id. at 976–77, the court added that plaintiffs “may challenge the Medicaid violation before it has
taken place, so long as the requisite ‘significant risk’ exists….” Id. at 977. A factual finding that
each class member “was subject to an identical ‘significant risk’ of a future Medicaid
violation…would support injunctive relief.” Id.
In Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit upheld the
lower court’s refusal to terminate existing systemic relief to remedy constitutional violations
stemming from delays in attorney-client visitation, where the plaintiffs, prisoners at a
correctional facility, pointed to systemic factors that could cause those delays. Though the
defendants “emphasize[d] that plaintiff did not put on a single witness who alleged that
Departmental procedures led to a total denial of access to courts or counsel,” the district court
held that prospective, systemwide relief nevertheless remained appropriate, ordering the
corrections officials to recommend a plan for systemic changes within 30 days. Benjamin v.
Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157, 177–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Similarly, in Markva v. Haveman, 168 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff’d, 317
F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2003), the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that several systemwide
methodologies for determining Medicaid eligibility violated federal statutes, and issued a
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permanent injunction restraining use of those policies. Id. at 719. Specifically, the court held
that the “risk of further injury to health warrants injunctive relief.” Id. The opinion referenced
no retrospective evidence of any specific harm, despite the State’s assertion otherwise. Indeed,
the court noted that the case involved only questions of the legal validity of the state’s
systemwide policies. Id. at 707.
The State also curiously contends that a more rigorous standard of harm is applicable
because Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief in addition to injunctive relief. The State’s Response
cites no supporting authority for such a proposition, and Plaintiffs are not aware of any case
where a court has raised a plaintiff’s burden because the plaintiff seeks both declaratory and
injunctive relief. The argument makes little logical sense in any event. The U.S. Supreme Court
has called declaratory judgments “a milder alternative” to injunctive relief. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974). It defies logic that the inclusion of a less intrusive remedy in a case
could somehow heighten a plaintiff’s burden beyond the standard burden for injunctive
relief. Rather, courts routinely and without question apply the substantial risk test to declaratory
relief claims, as this Court did in ISEEO V. 142 Idaho at 453, 129 P.3d at 1202 (noting district
court granted declaratory judgment and issued further orders “addressing remedial
measures”); see also, e.g., Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689 (approving substantial risk of harm test for
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief); M.B. by Eggemeyer v. Corsi, 327 F.R.D. 271, 270,
280 (W.D. Mo. 2018) (same).
E.

The Substantial Risk of Harm Test is Consistent with this Court’s Standing
Analysis.

The standing analysis this Court conducted in Tucker I itself incorporates the substantial
risk test. This Court specifically noted that the relevant question for standing to seek injunctive
relief is whether a plaintiff can “demonstrate a likelihood of repeated injury or future harm to the
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plaintiff in the absence of the injunction.” Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d at 62 (quoting
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983)). Courts have found standing for
prospective relief claims where a named plaintiff presents evidence “that statewide policies and
practices expose [the plaintiff] to a risk of similar future harms” and that the deficient policies
and practices may be abated by injunctive relief to prevent the risk of harm. Snyder, 922 F.3d at
967. Both the named plaintiffs and all class members are exposed to the same State policies and
practices and therefore face the same substantial risk of future harm. Appellants’ Br. at 34–35.
Plaintiffs thus still have standing to pursue injunctive relief. Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d
at 62.10
III.

Even If Proof of Individualized Cronic Harm Were Required with Respect to Class
Representatives, Plaintiffs Would Not Need to Show All Class Members Suffered
Such Harm.
The State’s suggestion that Plaintiffs must prove that unnamed class members suffered

actual or constructive denials of counsel under the retrospective, post-conviction rubric set out in
Cronic is misguided. Both general principles for class actions seeking injunctive relief and the
class definition in this case require otherwise.
Even if Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate actual or presumed prejudice under
Strickland’s or Cronic’s retrospective tests to qualify for prospective injunctive relief in this
class action, they need only show it for the named plaintiffs. That is because class actions are,
by definition, representative: it is the named plaintiffs who, having met the commonality,
typicality and adequacy requirements for class certification, must prove their case on behalf of
10

The State suggests that Plaintiffs seek relaxed standing on appeal. Respondents’ Br. at 20.
Plaintiffs satisfy the traditional standing requirements to seek prospective, injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs only briefed relaxed standing in Tucker I as an alternative to traditional standing, which
this Court found satisfied. Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 26, 394 P.3d at 69.
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the similarly situated class members. Requiring proof of injury to unnamed class members in
order to establish liability—as the State proposes—would defeat the efficiency goals of class
action litigation. See, e.g., In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 155 F.R.D. 209, 212
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (“The efficiencies of a class action would be thwarted if routine discovery of
absent class members is permitted, particularly on the issue of liability.”).11
The State’s proposed framework is both novel and particularly inappropriate to class
actions seeking prospective injunctive relief, where the relevant inquiry is not whether certain
class members have already suffered cognizable injury but, rather, “whether class members seek
uniform relief from a practice applicable to all of them.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105,
1125 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, the precise membership of an injunctive-relief class is considered
largely inconsequential; “the focus in a (b)(2) class [one seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief] is more heavily placed on the nature of the remedy sought, and…a remedy obtained by
one member will naturally affect the others, [so] the identities of individual class members are
less critical.” Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2015); accord J.D. v. Azar, 925
F.3d 1291, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2019). When a class of plaintiffs raises a substantial risk of future
harm, injunctive relief is necessary to protect all class members from being susceptible to injury.
See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017 (“In a suit for prospective relief the plaintiff's burden is to show
‘the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at
11

Requiring proof of injury to unnamed class members would also be inconsistent with the wellsettled principle—often called the “one-plaintiff” rule—that standing requirements are satisfied
if one plaintiff can establish injury and standing. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d
970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Standing exists if at least one named plaintiff meets the
requirements.”); Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25, 165 Idaho 690, ___, 451 P.3d
25, 33 (2019) (citing Tucker I and holding that “[f]or class actions, standing is met ‘if at least one
named plaintiff satisfies the requirements of standing against every named defendant.’”). That
rule would be meaningless if plaintiffs had to prove injury to unnamed class members in order to
prevail.
APPELLANTS’ REPLY – Docket No. 46882-2019
18

law.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974))). Thus, whether all class
members have already suffered an injury is beside the point. See, e.g., Cole v. City of Memphis,
Tenn., No. 2:13-CV-02117-JPM-dkv, 2014 WL 8508560 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014), modified,
No. 2:13-CV-02117-JPM, 2015 WL 3442277 (W.D. Tenn. May 28, 2015) (certifying class of
individuals who are subject to unconstitutional police practices in a particular region, even
though all class members had not yet suffered irreparable harm from those practices).
The class definition here recognizes this principle. This class consists of “all indigent
persons who are now or who will be under formal charge before a state court in Idaho of having
committed any offense…” R., p. 924 (emphasis added). The State’s systemic failures create a
substantial risk for all class members that they will be subject to actual or constructive denials of
counsel. As is the case generally in class actions seeking injunctive relief, the purpose of this
lawsuit is to obtain uniform injunctive relief that will protect the class as a whole, as the district
court held when it granted class certification: “Were the requested relief ordered, the State would
be obligated to create a plan to ensure public defense is constitutionally adequate….Ordering
Appellants’ requested relief against the PDC would create a substantial likelihood of remedying
the injuries alleged.” R., p. 915–18 (quoting Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 25–26, 394 P.3d at 68–69).
The State’s proposed framework—limiting class injunctive relief to harm to class members that
has already accrued—would disregard members of the class who have yet to be “under formal
charge” and therefore have not yet been harmed or faced substantial risk of harm. Such an
outcome would thwart the entire purpose of certifying the class here.
The State’s passing reliance on Lewis v. Casey also does not help their case. As an initial
matter, Lewis was not the kind of systemic challenge to statewide policies that this case is. See
Lewis, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); id. at 389 n.10 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting adequate
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statewide policies already in place). It was also decided long before the landmark Plata opinion
on systemic reform cases, where the Court held that plaintiffs in systemic reform cases need not
prove their claims by showing particular instances of harm or even particular deficiencies, but
instead may prevail by showing systemwide deficiencies “taken as a whole” that subject class
members to “substantial risk of serious harm.” 563 U.S. at 505 n.3; see also id. at 532 (finding
systemwide remedy for inadequate healthcare was not overbroad where “the medical care
program is run at a systemwide level, and resources are shared among the correctional
facilities”). As the Parsons court explained, closely reviewing Plata, plaintiffs may be
sufficiently endangered “by a single policy.” 754 F.3d at 678. Lewis was also an extreme case,
where the Court took the unusual step of overriding a district court’s typically broad discretion
because the scope of the injunction drastically exceeded the number of violations—which was
concerning in the prison administration context, where courts must be careful not to become
“enmeshed in the minutia of prison operations.” Id. at 362.
Here, the State ironically asks this Court and the district court to enmesh themselves in
evaluating the granular minutia of individual counties and cases within Idaho’s statewide public
defense system. Examining instead the systemic risk of harm that the structures and policies
framing Idaho’s public defense system is not just a more manageable approach, it is the proper
one under established principles of class actions and prospective, equitable relief.
IV.

The “Substantial Risk of Harm” Test is Both Fair and Workable, and Enables the
Court to Evaluate the Evidence Most Probative to Plaintiffs’ Allegations.
As discussed at length above and in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, courts across the country

have applied the substantial risk of harm test to assess the constitutionality of public defense
systems in the context of litigants’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The State has
offered no reason to believe that this Court cannot undertake the same analysis, with the same
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guideposts that other courts (and the Idaho Public Defense Commission) have used to assess
public defense systems.
The American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System,
upon which many of the PDC’s own rules and regulations are based, offers one set of widely
accepted guideposts. See Appellants’ Br. at 30 n.11. The NLADA’s Guidelines for Legal
Defense Systems in the United States is another. Both of these standards are featured
prominently on the PDC’s website as a “[r]esource” for indigent defense providers,12 and the
ABA’s Ten Principles informed some of the standards adopted by the PDC. See R., p. 9976:8–
77:4. Courts routinely rely on these guidelines, and standards like them, when assessing right-tocounsel violations, including systemic claims similar to those advanced by Plaintiffs here. See
Kuren, 146 A.3d at 744; Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 n. 4; see also Appellants’ Br. at 31
n.12. Evidence about these structural issues is the most probative of whether the State has met
its “ultimate responsibility” of ensuring its system passes constitutional muster. Tucker I, 162
Idaho at 21, 394 P.3d at 64. Nothing in the substantial risk test requires the wholesale exclusion
of the type of evidence the State would prefer to put on—such as anecdotal evidence from
roughly 20 individual public defenders, even though they constitute no more than 5% of the
public defense roster13 and were mostly cherry-picked from Idaho’s least populous counties. But
that evidence has limited dispositive value in proving (or disproving) the existence of systemic
issues caused by the inadequacy of statewide policies, administration, funding, and supervision.

12

Idaho Public Def. Comm’n, Resources (last
https://pdc.idaho.gov/standards-and-guidelines-old/resources/.

13

visited

Apr.

22,

2019),

According to the most recent public defender roster Plaintiffs have received, there are 380
attorneys that offer indigent defense services in Idaho.
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Imagine, for example, that a court was tasked with assessing whether a public bus system
was running effectively and adequately serving its residents. That court may consider testimony
from 20 of the system’s nearly 400 bus drivers as part of its analysis, including whether those
bus drivers believed they had adequate capacity to serve their bus routes. It may also consider
testimony from passengers and potential passengers, to gauge, for example, whether they were
consistently picked up on time at their particular bus stop. But if the court’s goal is to obtain a
full picture of the bus system, its inquiry could not stop there. After all, there may be a handful
of areas in certain parts of the system that do, in fact, have adequate drivers, routes, buses, and
maintenance facilities. But since the existence of those sufficiently resourced regions does not
preclude shortages elsewhere, the court would also have to scrutinize the funding streams for the
entire transportation system, robust statistics regarding ridership and schedule accuracy, and
regions’ access to necessary maintenance services. It would look at the drivers’ and maintenance
staff’s training, particularly in operating any specialized systems, even if all 20 bus driver
witnesses appeared to be well trained. And if a court were tasked with ensuring the adequacy of
the bus transportation system as a whole, it would enter relief designed to ensure the entire
system, not just isolated regions, is appropriately structured and funded to mitigate any
substantial risk of harm to the population throughout the system.
These are the types of inquiries—and evidence—that help courts best assess whether a
system is structurally sound and equipped to serve its intended beneficiaries. The substantial risk
test therefore is not “divorced” from indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights, Respondents’
Br. at 32; it is squarely focused on eliminating structural barriers to accessing their right to
counsel. Just as a commuter cannot depend on reliable public transportation from an inadequate
bus system, even if buses sometimes run on time in certain areas, so too an indigent defendant is
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at a significant risk of having their Sixth Amendment rights violated if the public defense system
is underfunded, understaffed, or otherwise structurally inadequate, even though public defenders
sincerely try to do their jobs despite the system’s failures.
Plaintiffs have presented ample factual evidence relevant to these structural inquiries.
They have introduced thousands of pages of evidence taken from the PDC’s own records,
including reports documenting excessive caseloads and inadequate investigation and expert
resources. Plaintiffs have also introduced deposition testimony of PDC’s senior leadership and
other key witnesses. This factual record is indeed complemented by expert testimony, but
Plaintiffs’ case (and the substantial risk of harm standard) is by no means reduced to a “battle of
the experts.” Id. at 30. Experts may help interpret this evidence, identify where they believe
cracks in the system persist, and explain the risks they pose. But the voluminous evidence that
Plaintiffs have offered is what strikes to the core of this case: that these cracks exist, that they
have existed for many years, and that the State has failed to fix them.
V.

The State’s Additional Arguments Are Just a Series of Red Herrings.
In a last ditch attempt to undermine the well-established substantial risk test, the State

presents a series of arguments that are nothing more than red herrings. First, and as this Court
has recognized, the State has the non-delegable responsibility under the Sixth Amendment to
ensure its public defense system—including each county’s implementation—is constitutionally
sound. Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 21, 394 P.3d at 64. The substantial risk test does not alter this
responsibility, or otherwise improperly divest control from individual counties: the State must
provide the structural policies, administration, funding, and supervision to guarantee the system’s
constitutionality, and individual counties may still make their own choices within the boundaries
of those policies and subject to that supervision. See Respondents’ Br. at 37. Second, nothing in
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this test requires the State to “prove a negative” or show that there is “no actual or constructive
denial[] of counsel.” Id. at 30. Plaintiffs continue to carry the burden of proof. And the State
still has an opportunity to show that Plaintiffs have not met that burden, through whatever
relevant evidence it decides to proffer. For instance, nothing in the substantial risk test requires
the exclusion of the State’s use of Camas County (one of Idaho’s least populous counties) as
evidence that the State’s system does not pose a substantial risk of harm. Plaintiffs merely
maintain that evidence from individual counties, just like evidence from individual public
defenders or individual indigent defendants, has limited probative value when it comes to
assessing systemic deficiencies in Idaho’s public defense system. But if the State would prefer
to focus on Camas County—which was responsible for 0.016% of the state’s reported indigent
cases in FY2018—nothing in the substantial risk test prevents it from doing so. See R.,
p. 14347–49.
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the long-established substantial risk of harm test promoted is
both fair and workable as well as correct as a matter of law. The State’s approach, on the other
hand, lacks support in the systemic Sixth Amendment case law and is entirely impractical for
assessing the systemic claim advanced here. By insisting that each and every class member must
show constructive or actual harm, the State is attempting to convert this lawsuit to a series of
individual inquiries into the performance of individual defenders in individual cases throughout
the state. It is therefore not surprising that courts routinely reject this type of individualized
inquiry, and appreciate that systemic Sixth Amendment claims examine attorneys’ “limitations”
through the lens of the “substantial structural deficiencies” challenged by the plaintiffs. Kuren,
146 A.3d at 748; see also Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 226 (N.Y. 2010) (“the basic
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constitutional mandate for the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at all critical stages is
at risk of being left unmet because of systemic conditions, not…the personal failings and poor
professional decisions of individual attorneys”). The substantial risk test therefore allows courts
to assess reliably the problems at issue—the State’s failure to provide an adequate public defense
system—while avoiding a time-consuming and largely unhelpful retrospective, case-by-case
inquiry into the performance of countless public defenders in thousands of criminal cases across
the state.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2020.
By: /s/ Richard Eppink
RICHARD EPPINK
Attorney for plaintiffs
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